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Abstract
The paper explores the institutional determinants of differences in European,
Japanese and American unemployment and innovation pattern in a „comparative
institutional analysis“ perspective. Building on the definition of different modes of
coordination among firms, the question is addressed as to how institutional settings
affect firms’ innovation strategy. A generalized efficiency wage model is developed
determining both equilibrium unemployment and innovation. The mode of
coordination is shown to affect firms’ choice between radical and incremental
innovations as well as firms’ response (in terms of innovation strategy) to increased
competitive pressure. Higher unemployment may result as a consequence of
specialization along innovation trajectories.
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Diskussions-Papier wird untersucht, welchen Einfluß institutionelle
Determinanten auf die unterschiedlichen Muster von Arbeitslosigkeit und Innovation
in Europa, in Japan und in den USA haben. Dies geschieht durch eine
„vergleichende Institutionen-Analyse“. Ausgehend von unterschiedlichen Formen der
Koordination zwischen Unternehmen ist die Analyse auf die Frage gerichtet, wie
institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen die Entscheidung für eine bestimmte
Innovationsstrategie von Unternehmen beeinflussen. In einem allgemeinen
Effizienzlohn-Modell werden Gleichgewichts-Arbeitslosigkeit und Innovation
bestimmt.
Die je spezifische Form der Koordination wird dargestellt in ihrer Bedeutung für die
Entscheidung von Unternehmen für eine radikale oder eine inkrementelle
Innovationsstrategie. Sie wird außerdem auch daraufhin analysiert, wie die
Unternehmen auf den gewachsenen Konkurrenzdruck reagieren und welche
Entscheidungen sie hinsichtlich ihrer Innovationsstrategie fällen. Eine höhere
Arbeitslosigkeit als Auswirkung von Spezialisierungen, ausgelöst durch
innovationsbezogene Übergangsprozesse, ist nicht auszuschließen.
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1I. Introduction
This paper aims to analyze the relationship between equilibrium
unemployment and innovation patterns across different institutional settings.
The institutional setting is represented through a set of parameters grasping the
mode of coordination prevailing between firms and the intensity of market
competition. In particular, two opposite modes of coordination are identified: a
fully decentralized market-coordination and a fully centralized coordination (i.e.
through business associations). Building on the recent literature on comparative
institutional analysis, this distinction allows me to envisage two institutional
configurations tentatively corresponding to the modes of coordination
respectively prevailing in France and the US, on the one hand, and in Germany
and Japan, on the other hand.
The paper addresses the following major questions from a theoretical
point of view: does the institutional setting affect firms’ innovation choice? How
do firms modify their innovation strategy to meet increased competitive pressure
on new product markets? Which is the overall effect of these processes on the
equilibrium rate of unemployment? To answer these questions, I develop a
generalized efficiency wage model bringing together the analysis of the
determinants of both unemployment as well as the nature of innovation (1). In
order to do that, I focus on two different forms of R&D, namely knowledge-
based research and product-oriented research. Innovation at the firm level is
supposed to come from the possibility of increasing profits through product-
oriented innovations, while knowledge-based research is provided in external
(public-funded) research centers. Starting from this characterization, the paper
focuses on the determinants and effects of firm’ innovation strategy: the optimal
2innovation strategy corresponds to the proportion of scholars affected by the
firm to product-oriented research, in such a way to maximize anticipated
profits. Since firms’ evaluation of the overall effects of innovation on profits
depends on their capacity to internalize all the indirect externalities of their
individual choice, the optimal innovation strategy is affected by the degree and
nature of external coordination, that is by the prevailing institutional setting.
In particular, I assume that individual firms’ innovation strategy has
direct and indirect effects at both the macro and the micro levels: at the micro
level, innovation affects the internal structure of the firm, that is the incentive
scheme and the efficiency of internal coordination; while at the macro level,
innovation may affect products’ range and turn-over. In the paper, I assume that
centralized coordination improves firms’ perception of the indirect effects (both
at the micro as well as at the micro level) of their innovation choice. Because of
the impact of innovation of their internal structure, when choosing their optimal
innovation strategy firms face both an effort determination as well as an internal
coordination enhancement problem. Therefore, profits maximization takes place
in an efficiency wage framework with knowledge-based innovations playing
their role in destroying matches on the labor market. The global equilibrium
configuration of the model is defined as the couple (u, z) determining
equilibrium unemployment (u) as well as the optimal innovation strategy (z).
The structure of the paper is as follows: I first describe the different
existing forms of research ad innovation and the role of the mode of
coordination in affecting firms’ perception of the externalities of their
innovation choice (section II); then I analyze the direct and indirect impacts of
3innovation on the economic structure, both at the micro and at the macro level
(section III); third I derive the optimal innovation choice for firms respectively
in a context of fully centralized and fully decentralized market-coordination, and
analyze the effects of a change in the intensity of market competition (section
IV); finally, I derive the overall equilibrium configuration for the model
describing the impact of different forms of innovation on the equilibrium rate of
unemployment (section V); in section VI, I present some conclusions concerning
the main results delivered by the theoretical analysis.
II.  Forms of innovation
II.a Outlook of the model
The central focus in the analysis of innovation and unemployment, which
follows, is the opposition between two different forms of innovation:
product-oriented versus knowledge-based. Product-oriented research basically
consists in developing new products that either add up or substitute to old ones.
Quite differently, knowledge-based research is a way to produce new
knowledge. The two forms of R&D correspond to very different tasks of
research that are likely to be performed and/or funded by different
organizations. In particular, I will assume that knowledge-based research is
accomplished by public research centers with no production aims. In fact, firms
are not willing to bare the risk associated to knowledge-based research (whose
benefits are also more difficult to appropriate by the innovating firm) and
ultimately invest only in product-oriented research (2). In any case, the new
knowledge generated through knowledge-based research may then be introduced
in the production system through new goods incorporating knowledge’
4advances. According to Teece’ distinction between radical and incremental
innovations (see Teece, 1986), new goods can be assumed to be radically new if
they require firms to acquire radically new competence in order to produce them
(see also Soskice, 1996 on this point). I will assume that this definition applies
to the new goods incorporating knowledge’ advances: in order to be able to
produce this special category of new goods, firms need to bring in new
resources, and this will mainly be done by renewing their employment matches
(see section III.a on this point).
In the following, I will take up an efficiency wage perspective in order to
model the firms’ maximization problem concerning both the innovation strategy
as well as production and employment levels in a context where: i) firms’ choice
is affected by the prevailing institutional setting and ii) different forms of
innovation have an impact on the structure of workers’ incentive (and therefore
on workers’ effort and internal coordination). The following scheme may help
the reader understanding the global structure of the model.
Institutional factors
 -external  coordination
 -forms of competition
Firm’s
incentives
Innovation
choice
Workers’
incentives
Unemployment
rate
Innovation pattern
Firm’s MoO
 -coordination
 -effort
Cost of job  loss pro fit
tenure coord ina tion
Figure 1
5In particular, consider an economy characterized by N firms each one
developing a whole range of new products -the equilibrium value of N will
eventually be determined by the model. Firms are given a one-period patent for
each new product that they develop. Therefore each firm obtains n monopolistic
market positions, n being the (endogenous) number of new goods developed by
firm i. Then we can think of the N firms as being N different sectors: each
sector’s dimension is defined by the range of new goods produced by the
incumbent firm. At the end of the period, the n patents end up, goods become
obsolete and start to be sold on purely competitive markets (3). The only way to
avoid it is for the incumbent firm to renew its products range (this means that
firms always have an incentive to embed new knowledge, whenever available,
into new products). This can be done by exploiting the results of a knowledge-
based innovation, which is only possible if a knowledge-based innovation has
occurred during the period (in the next section I will analyze in greater detail the
effects of the two forms of innovation on firms’ profits).
Assume that the economy is characterized by a number of scientists equal
to H·N. I will consider that H is given, therefore a fixed number of scientists per
sector is given: each firm/sector can use up to H scientists for its product-
oriented research. Then, firm i‘s anticipated profits can be written as:
(1) Dt(i) = n{³t
f
Si exp(-r(W-t)) exp(-(1-Q)(W-t)) dW} - c(H) - F
with: r = interest rate; n = new products; Q = probability of a knowledge-based
innovation; S = per period monopolistic profit; c(H) = product-oriented research
cost; F = fixed entry cost.
6As we can see, anticipated profits depend both on product-oriented as well
as on knowledge-based research (through variables n and Q). This will be
analyzed in sections II.b and II.c below. Anticipated profits also depends on per
period monopolistic profits (S) that is the profits that each firm can earn on its
imperfectly competitive new products markets; as we will see, the level of
monopolistic profits will depend on the outcome of profit maximization on the
labor market in an efficiency wage framework (see section III).
II.b Effects of product and knowledge innovations
In this section I will focus on modeling determinants and effects of the
two forms of innovation. As far as the effects of product-oriented and
knowledge-based research are concerned, I will assume that:
i)  both forms of innovation have a micro as well as a macro effect: the micro
effect concerns the internal structure of the firm, that is workers’ effort and
coordination; and the macro effect concerns products’ range and turn-over;
ii)  global resources for innovation are given (and equal to H); therefore, firms
determine the final allocation of resources between product-oriented and
knowledge-based research by choosing the proportion of scientists that they
secure and directly hire. This means that firms’ choices have indirect effects
that affect the amount of research undertaken outside the firm and the overall
balance between the two forms of innovation.
In this section I analyze the macro effects of the two forms of innovation;
in the next section, I will make it clearer the distinction between direct and
indirect effects (and the crucial role of coordination among firms, in this
respect) and finally I will move on to the micro effects in section III.
7From point i) we can deduce that both knowledge-based as well as
product-oriented innovations have an impact on products structure. In fact, the
intensity of product-oriented research defines the firm’s range of new products;
while knowledge-based innovation determines the rhythm of products turn-over.
No common perspective exists in literature concerning the macro impact of
knowledge-based innovations on profits. This can either be considered positive
(i.e. in the literature on endogenous growth) or negative (i.e. literature on
Schumpeterian endogenous growth: Aghion-Howitt, 1994; Amable, 1995). I will
assume that the macro effect of knowledge-based innovation on profit is
positive: firms can exploit knowledge’s advances in order to invent radically
new products and preserve their monopolistic power on product market (see also
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1996 for a similar approach). In fact, when a
knowledge-based innovation occurs new knowledge is made available which can
be embedded by firms into new products. If this is done (and I assume here that
this is the case) new products substitute to obsolete ones: substitution is more
frequent, more frequent fundamental innovations are. Since we know from point
ii) that a higher probability of knowledge-based innovation can only be achieved
by leaving a larger proportion of scientists to public research centers, firms
actually face a trade-off between products’ range and products’ turnover, when
choosing the optimal amount of research.
From an overall point of view, depending on which of these two types of
research prevails, a priority will be given either to products’ range or to
products’ turnover as a preferred pattern of innovation. Since firms only invest
in product-oriented research, the prevailing patter of innovation is actually
8determined by the firm’s innovation strategy. In order to understand what the
firm’s innovation strategy is we have to start modeling the two innovation
functions.
To do that, we can follow Amable (1996) and assume that i)
product-oriented research, because of its nature of «innovation along a given
trajectory», allows the firm to develop new products with a reasonable certainty
while ii) knowledge-based research is subject to randomness and will eventually
generate an innovative result with a given probability (Q). This means that the
product-oriented innovation function for firm/sector i can be specified as
follows:
(2) ni = n(ziH),
where: ni = number of new products developed; zi = proportion of scientists
affected to product-oriented R&D; n() is a concave function.
The probability of a knowledge-based innovation depends on the intensity
of knowledge-based research inside the whole economy: fundamental
innovations are not the product of a sector-specific R&D activity, but rather an
economy-wide result affecting all sectors at the same time. The fact that only
R&D intensity actually matters also means that Q grows up as the proportion
(and not the total number) of scientists affected to fundamental innovations
increases. This proportion is given by (1-z), therefore one obtains:
(3) Q = Q(1-z), z = (¦ zj)/N, j = 1, ...., N,
where Q is assumed to be constant return to scale function, grasping the role of
learning processes in knowledge-based research (4).The retained specification
grasps the trade-off between product-oriented and knowledge-based innovations:
9the more intensive is firms’ direct R&D, the larger is the proportion of scientists
affected to product-oriented research, which means that the proportion of
scientists available for knowledge-based research decreases, thus reducing the
probability of fundamental innovations to occur.
II.c The « mode of coordination »
Since knowledge-based R&D is undertaken outside the firm, we need to
make explicit assumptions on firms’ awareness of the externality linking zi to
the probability (Q) of a knowledge-based innovation. In fact, the firm is not
necessarily likely to take into consideration the effect of zi on Q when
determining its optimal innovation strategy. In the following, I separately
analyze the two cases where firms do take into account this externality as well
as the alternative one where they do not. In particular, I will assume that the
capacity to internalize externalities is crucially related to the prevailing mode of
coordination among firms.
The notion of  « mode of coordination » refers to the way firms coordinate
each other on the markets (labor markets, or product markets; here I will focus
on product markets). If we stick to the two extreme solutions, coordination may
be achieved either through purely market mechanisms or through more explicit
links, formally and/or informally established. The main interest in opposing
these two modes of coordination is that they grasp some aspects of  more
general distinctions such as the one between different « social systems of
innovation » developed by Amable-Barré-Boyer (1997); and the one between
coordinated and non-coordinated market economies proposed by Soskice
(Soskice, 1990). These two distinctions encompass more general elements
10
relating to the organization of production inside and outside the firm. In their
book, Amable, Barré and Boyer present a theoretical and empirical analysis,
leading them to describe the social systems of innovation prevailing in France
and the US as opposed to the ones prevailing in Japan and Germany: the former
would be characterized, among other, by a mechanism of « régulation » mainly
through markets, while the latter would rely more on explicit coordination
through different kinds of business associations.
In the following, I will build up on this literature and simply distinguish
between centralized and decentralized coordination, the latter corresponding to
market-coordinated firms and the former to firms connected through a network
of explicit links. In more formal terms, this leads us to the opposition between
the analytical framework of the purely decentralized economy, on the one hand,
and the alternative case of firms acting as a kind of « social planner », on the
other. It is straightforward then to expect firms in a centrally coordinated
economy to have a macroeconomic perspective, whereas firms connected
through market coordination do not. This means that, if we go back to the
definition of the probability of a fundamental innovation: Q = Q(1-z), with
z = (¦ zj)/N, then firms in a decentralized framework simply consider z as given
and do not anticipate the effect of zi on Q -that is the indirect effects of their
innovation strategy on the probability of a fundamental innovation. Quite
differently, centrally coordinated firms fully anticipate the above effect, which
means that, because of symmetry between firms: 1-z = 1-zi. This expression is
the one that the social planner would consider in order to define the optimal
firms’ innovation strategy (5).
11
To sum up, the choice of the optimal innovation strategy is likely to
depend on the « mode of coordination » prevailing among firms, in the following
way (see table 1).
Table 1
Modes of Coordination
Market-coordinated model
Ø
no internalization of externality
Centrally-coordinated model
Ø
internalization of externality
We can now go back to the definition of firms’ anticipated profits. As we
have seen, firm i anticipated profits can be written as follows (see equation 1):
Dt(i) = n(zi){³t
f
Si exp(-r(W-t)) exp(-(1-Q)(W-t)) dW} - c(zi) - F
with: r = interest rate; n = new products; Q = probability of a knowledge-based
innovation; S = per period monopolistic profit (defined later); c(z) = R&D
costs; F = fixed entry cost. Anticipated profits depend both on product-oriented
as well as on knowledge-based research (through variables n and Q). In
particular, when the probability of a knowledge advance decreases the firm
faces a reduction of its own profit expectation due to the lower probability of
renewing obsolete products (and obtaining new patents). When the probability
that no fundamental innovation occurs (1-Q) grows up, expected profits go down
and reduces to per period profits if        (1-Q) = 1.
On the basis of the above definition of anticipated profits, the optimal
innovation strategy should be designed as a solution to the trade-off between
products’ range and products’ turn-over. The final solution actually depends on
whether or not firms anticipate the external effect of their choice (of zi) on the
12
aggregate probability of a fundamental innovation. However, this reasoning
overlooks the fact that each innovation brings about indirect effects on firms
structure stemming from the necessary adaptations of firms to modified
production conditions. This indirect effects are likely to be incorporated into the
determination of monopolistic profits S.
When a knowledge-based innovation occurs, major modifications are
produced that eventually affect product structure as well as employment
matches. Since obsolete products give way to new goods (as in Amable, 1996)
the firm needs to upgrade its resources in order to be able to produce these new
goods (see Teece’s definition of radical innovations). Previously existing
employment matches become inadequate and employment relationships have to
be renewed: this determines important consequences on internal variables such
as effort. In the same line as this, increasing the products range also produces
important effects at the firm level: growing diversification makes internal
coordination of production more difficult, thus increasing internal costs and/or
determining output waste due to lack of coordination.
The complete set of opposed effects that knowledge-based and product-
oriented research respectively determine inside the economy, either at the
aggregate or the firm level, are reported thereafter in table 2.
Table 2
Effect  on Knowledge-based R&D Product-oriented R&D
positive negative positive negative
Si Effort Coordination
e h
Anticipated
profits
Products
turn-over
Products
range
Q ni
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In next sections, I will analyze the ways knowledge-based and product-
oriented innovations affect monopolistic profits. I will focus in particular on the
impact of innovation on firms’ organization, both in terms of workers’ effort as
well as workers’ coordination. I will show that different forms of innovation
may differently alter firms’ incentive schemes, and that this determines major
effects on the equilibrium rate of unemployment.
III. Formalizing the firm and the labor market
In this section I focus on the definition of per period monopolistic profit.
In order to do that, I will study firm’s behavior on the labor market assuming
that labor (L) and effort (e) are the only production inputs. Under the
assumption of monopolistic product markets, defining the equilibrium
configuration of employment and wage will allow me to determine the ex-post
amount of profit earned each period by the firm on new products markets. In the
following I will drop the index i identifying individual firm variables since the
analysis will be entirely carried on at the firm level. Let me consider the
decision-making problem faced by firms when determining the optimal level of
production and wage. This generally consists in maximizing profits, that is:
(4) Ss = PsYs - (w + s)Ls,
where: Y = production; w = real wage; Lp = hours of work hired; s = real cost of
supervising resources per hour of work.
The production function is:
(5) Y =  hF(eLp),
where: h = coordination efficiency; e = effort per hour of work.
Product demand is determined by the following (inverse) demand function:
14
(6) Ps = Ys(D-1), D < 1,
Ps being the relative price of intermediate product s (in relation to a general
price index).
The introduction of s allows me to consider the twofold role played by the
central authority respectively in the domain of coordination between production
units and control upon work intensity: s = t + m, where: t = coordination cost
per hour of work; m = monitoring cost per hour of work. To keep things simple
I will assume that the unit real cost of both coordination and monitoring
resources is equal to one. Contrary to other models, here both workers' ability to
coordinate as well as the level of effort are determined by the nature of the
incentive scheme implemented by the firm. And the nature of this incentive
scheme is conditioned by two crucial factors: innovation patterns and the
internal organizational structure of the firm. Let me make this point clear,
starting by an explicit modeling of the effort and coordination functions (6).
III.a Workers’ effort and the labor market
I take up here the efficiency wage approach developed by S. Bowles (see
Bowles, 1985). In his contribution, the author applies workers’ utility
maximization to show that an increase in workers’ effort can be obtained mainly
in tow ways:
- through "direct monitoring" over workers (m);
- through workers’ "cost of job loss" (wc).
Building on this result, I will adopt a specification of the effort function
such as: e = effort per hour of work = e(wc , m) with: we/wwc>0, we/wm>0. In
15
particular, I will use throughout an explicit functional form in order to make it
easier to interpret the model’s results, that is:
(7) e(wc,m) = wcamb.
This formulation allows the consideration of the complementary role of
the two control devices: no monitoring incentive is possible if there is no cost in
loosing his job, conversely no wage incentive can succeed if there is no direct
control on effort intensity.
As far as the cost of job loss is concerned, following Bowles I define it as
the income loss a worker incurs when he looses his job. Therefore, to evaluate
workers’ cost of job loss I need to define both their current income and the
alternative income they can expect to earn in case they are fired. Let me call
these two incomes, respectively, wcu and wd. Then, the cost of job loss is: wc =
wcu - wd.
I will assume that workers are assigned to jobs at the beginning of each
period, that is after a knowledge-based innovation has occurred. But then,
knowledge-based research can produce an innovation with a probability Q. Since
this innovation is assumed to destroy any previously establish match between
workers and firms, workers will take into account the possibility of loosing their
jobs because of innovation (that is, independently of their effort performance)
when they evaluate their current income. This leads us to: wcu = (1-Q) w + Q wd,
where: w= real wage.
The cost of job loss is then equal to:
(8) wc = (1-Q) (w-wd),
16
thus grasping the role of knowledge-based innovations in reducing the incentive
pressure determined by monitoring through the firing threat (7). The rationale of
this result is as follows: when the probability of a fundamental innovation grows
up, high effort can no longer guarantees workers their jobs and this reduces
workers’ incentive to work harder.
The definition of the alternative income (in case of firing) depends on the
process of search on the labor market. The final issue of this process is crucially
affected by global job opportunities (grasped by the unemployment rate, u) and
specific workers’ characteristics (namely, transferability of competence). Here,
I will assume that workers have perfectly transferable competence and I will
focus only on the former factor (8). Then the final expression of the alternative
income (wd) is: wd = (1-u) wv + u w , with: wv = alternative market wage;
w = unemployment benefits; u = unemployment rate.
Once defined the expression of the alternative income wd we can easily
deduce the cost of job loss wc. As we can see, the probability of knowledge-
based innovations enters the definition of the cost of job loss and therefore
affects firm’s incentive scheme: a higher intensity in knowledge-based R&D is
likely to lead to a weakening of firms’ capacity to obtain a high level of
workers’ effort.
III.b Workers’ coordination inside the firm
Internal coordination is the product of the ability of workers and/or
hierarchy to correctly organize different production units. This allows the firm
to avoid wasteful actions thus reducing possible output loss: Ys =  hFs(eL),
where: h = coordination efficiency.
17
In the following, I will analyze the problem of internal coordination in the
context of multi-products firms. In this context, the firm has to allocate
optimally its resources between two different coordination tasks: coordination
between workers and between product divisions. Let me assume that each firm
is endowed with n ~t  units of coordination resources per hour of work; then a
cost (n ~t L) should be added to production costs due to extra-resources hired
for coordination. Since a multi-products firm requires two different coordination
tasks, part of the overall coordination resources n ~t  has to be transferred from
workers’ coordination (hw) to product divisions’ coordination (hd).
I will assume that in order to implement product divisions coordination an
amount E of « coordination activities » is to be realized which demands a
quantity  E(n ~t )G of the overall firm’s coordination resources. the remaining
coordination resources are directly used to improve coordination among
workers. Let me define: h = hwhd. Then: hd = EJ, hw = (n ~t  - E(n ~t )G)1-J.
The proportion (E) of transferred resources out of total resources (n ~t ) is
given  by the resolution of the following maximization problem:
Max  Y = EJ(n ~t  - E(n ~t )G)1-Je(wc, m)L
E
Y being the level of production.
The above problem can be solved one step before the complete resolution
of the model since results do not depends on the actual level of production.
Solution to the maximization problem is given by: wY/wE = 0, which leads to:
 (9) h* = ( )
~
1 11
1
- ×
×
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
-
-
g
g
g d
n t
, H = JG-1 > 0  (9),
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that establishes a negative effect of products’ diversification on coordination
ability. This is a common result in literature on firms organization. In fact, in
static frameworks, the complexity of handling organizational issues is
considered a major determinant of increasing unitary costs at high production
scale. On the other side, in more dynamic approaches, it is explicitly admitted
that a main limit to enlarging products range is the connected lost in the
efficiency of internal coordination (10).
We have now defined all the components of firms’ production function. In
the following, I will proceed to the resolution of the model under the assumption
that firms maximize their profits on the labor market given their monopolistic
position on (new) products markets.
IV. Patterns of innovation
In this section, I present the general solution to the model and analyze the
results concerning the optimal innovation strategy (z*) in different institutional
settings (namely the mode of coordination and product market competition); in
the next section, I will move on to the impact of different innovation patterns on
the equilibrium rate of innovation.
IV.a Equilibrium conditions
The firm has to choose: monitoring resources, wage, employment and
innovation strategy (respectively variables m, w, L and z) in order to maximize
its profits. Given that research allows the firm to earn monopolistic profits on
new goods markets, the present value of the future flow of profits is evaluated
as follows (see equation 1):
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Dt(i) = n(zi){³t
f
Si exp(-r(W-t)) exp(-(1-Q)(W-t)) dW} - c(zi) - F.
In the following I will avoid using the index i for individual firm variables
in order to simplify notation. Of course, whenever this could cause a
misunderstanding, I will clearly state variables’ status. Therefore, profits
maximization takes the following form:
Max n ³t
f
S exp[-(r-Q+1)(W-t)] dW - c(z) -F
m, L, w, z
where c(z) is the cost to the firm of scientists hired for product-oriented
research. I will assume c(z) to be a linear function, such that:
(10) c(z) = wS·z·H,
wS being the real wage of scientists. Scientists who are not hired by firms are
automatically affected to knowledge-based research in the public sector where
they are paid a wage Y which is assumed given. Therefore, the ex-post wage of
scientists is such that: wS (ex-post) = Y.
The expression of profits’ present value Dt can be rewritten, by solving
out the integral, in following form:
(11) Dt = n
r1 + -
×
n
p  - wS·z·H - F.
In order to simplify notation let me define the function:
(12) G(z) = n
r1 + - n
,
whose sign is determined by the composed effect of the two innovation
functions, n and Q (see below). Then, in order to solve the firms’ maximization
problem we simply have to substitute the demand function for Ps and the effort
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and coordination functions for Ys into profit’s expression, and then calculate the
first derivatives of profits in relation to the four control variables.
Considering that the demand function is: Ps = Ys(D-1), D<1, and that per
period profits for product s are: Ss = PsYs - (w + ~t + m)Ls, where: Ys =  h e
Ls is the production function, the maximization leads us to the following first-
order conditions:
(13.a) wS/wm = 0  Pshecm = 1/D,
.b wS/ww = 0  Pshecw = 1/D,
.c wS/wL = 0  DPshe = w + ~t + m.
.d wS/wz = 0  GczS + G(z)DPs(eczhL+ ehczL) - Y·H = 0,
since wS (ex-post) = Y.
Considering that, at the equilibrium, anticipated profits must be equal to
zero in order to prevent firms’ entry, a zero-profit condition must be added to
first-order conditions above. Imposing the zero-profit condition we obtain:
(14)  Sex-post = F z HG z
+ × ×v
( ) .
Considering also that equilibrium on the labor market necessarily implies:
(15) (1-u)LF = NL,
where LF = total labor force, the model is closed and can simply be solved
through subsequent substitutions.
On the basis of the set of conditions above we can determine the
equilibrium configuration of the model and study the interaction between
patterns of innovation and the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The
equilibrium configuration will be defined as the couple (z*, u*). The first step
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towards a complete resolution of the model is therefore to determine the optimal
innovation strategy z*. Let me start by substituting condition (3) and the zero-
profit condition into condition (4). From condition (3) we know that:
a
a
a
p
× × =
-
×
×
P L
e hs 1
, then substituting this and (5) into condition (4) I obtain:
15.dc ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F zH
G
G z
e
e
h
h H
z z z+ ×
¢
× - + ×
¢
+
¢
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
- - × =v a a a v1 1 0
In condition (4c) we can distinguish two different effects of innovation on
profits. The direct effect (first element in square brackets) is given by the
derivative of function G(z) and evaluates the effect of innovation on both
products’ range and turn-over. The indirect effect (second element in square
brackets) is instead given by the impact of innovation on both internal
coordination and effort. As we will see, these two effects combine in a different
way according to the prevailing mode of coordination (see below, table 4).
IV.b Optimal innovation strategy
In order to simplify notations and make the solution clearer, I need to
assume a specific functional form for the two innovation functions. As we have
seen (section II), the probability of each type of innovation grows up as the
proportion of scientists affected to related research increases: ni = n(ziH),         
Q = Q(1-z).
Since Q is assumed to be a constant return to scale function, I will simply
consider that the specification of the fundamental innovation probability has the
following form: Q = 1-z = 1-(¦ zj)/N, N being the number of sectors in the
economy. Product-based innovations are instead the result of a decreasing return
R&D activity, then we can simply assume that: ni = (ziH)c, c <1.
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Once defined the innovation functions, in order to determine the sign of
the function G(z), I still need to incorporate the assumptions on firms’
awareness of the externality linking zi to the probability of knowledge-based
innovations Q (see table 3 below).
As we have seen, the mode of coordination affects firms’ evaluation of the
impact of zi on anticipated profits. In fact, in section II we have shown that the
probability Q of a fundamental innovation depends on the aggregate proportion
of scientists affected to knowledge-based research (z). Market-coordinated firms
simply consider z as given and do not anticipate the effect of zi on Q.
Conversely, in the centrally-coordinated model, firms actually act as a kind of
« social planner ». Because of symmetry between sectors (firms), the expression
for Q is then equal to: 1-z = 1-zi. In the following, I will analyze separately the
case where firms take into account the externality and the alternative one (i.e.,
the centrally-coordinated versus market-coordinated model).
Table 3
Institutional settings
Centrally- versus
market-coordinated model
Intensity of products
markets competition
Parameters Externality on Q
  Q = 1- zi               Q = n
D
In table 4 below, I list all of the relevant effects of zi on anticipated
profits, indicating whether they are taken into consideration by firms (yes) or
not (no), depending on the prevailing mode of coordination.
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Table 4
Knowledge-based R&D Product-oriented R&D
positive negative positive negative
Products
turn-over Effort
Products
range
Internal
Coordination
Q e ni h
Market-
coordination
no no yes yes
Centralized
coordination
yes yes yes yes
From previous assumptions, summed up in the above table 4, we can
deduce that the specification of the different elements in equation 15.dc above is
as follows:
¢G
G z
z
( )
 
= -(1-c)/z centrally coordinated environment
c/z market-coordinated environment
¢e
e
z
 
= a/z centrally coordinated environment
0 market-coordinated environment
¢h
h
z
 
= -cH /z both
We can now proceed to the identification of the equilibrium patterns of
innovation in two alternative cases of a centrally coordinated model and of a
market-coordinated model. Let me consider first the case of a
centrally-coordinated (CC) model. The firm has a macroeconomic perspective
and takes into account the externality (on Q) coming form its choice of z.
Assuming that an interior solution exists (11) and taking for simplicity a zero
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interest rate value (r=0), the equilibrium value of the firm’s innovation strategy
is:
(17) zCC* = a e
a e v
× - + -
- - × - + +
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
×
( )
( ( ) )
1 1 1
2 2 1
c a c
c c a
F
H
( + ) +
.
In the alternative case of a market-coordinated (MC) model, we know that
the firm has no macroeconomic perspective and therefore it does not take into
account the externality (on Q) coming form its choice of z. Once again we
assume that the interest rate r is equal to zero, and we apply the same method as
before in order to solve the model.
Considering that the impact of z on effort via Q is overlooked because of
the hypothesis of a market-coordinated environment, the direct effect of
innovation on profits (i.e. through the function G(z)) is now positive while the
indirect effect (i.e. through internal organization) consists of one single factor,
that is the impact of innovation on coordination, the impact on effort being
neglected together with the externality on Q.
The optimal innovation strategy under this hypothesis is therefore (12):
(17) zMC* = c
c c
F
H×
- × +
- + × +
æ
Ł
ç
ö
ł
÷
×
1 1
1 1
a e
a e v
(
( ( ))
)
These results show that the innovation strategy followed by firms is
affected by the prevailing institutional configuration, that is the value of
parameters defining the mode of coordination between firms and the intensity of
product markets competition. It is therefore possible to develop a comparative
analysis of innovation patterns undertaken by firms under varying institutional
conditions. In particular, it is interesting to analyze possible differences in
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firms’ responses, in terms of innovation, to increasing market competition. In
fact, when market competition goes up, firms are faced with harder market
conditions and must therefore try to face them by modifying their innovation
strategy in order to improve profits. Form the analysis above we can easily see
that:
wzCC*/wD > 0,
wzMC*/wD < 0.
This result shows that when D grows up (that is, when the product market
becomes more competitive) the optimal z value for the centrally-coordinated
model increases while it decreases in the alternative case of a
market-coordinated model. This means that in a centrally-coordinated
environment firms try and face market competition by increasing their own
R&D activity, while market-coordinated firms prefer to allow for an increase in
fundamental innovations by reducing their own innovation activity (z).
Therefore, increasing market competition actually determines a diversification
in the trajectories of innovation followed by firms in the two different
institutional settings. To sum up, we should say that a centrally-coordinated
environment is more favorable to product-oriented innovation, while
market-coordinated firms are more likely to follow a pattern of innovation
focused on knowledge-based R&D.
Given our previous results, we should expect that product-oriented
R&D’s leadership ultimately shifts to firms acting in centrally-coordinated
institutional models when products markets become more competitive (i.e. D
increases). This result seems to be coherent with stylized facts from
26
comparative analyses of patterns of innovation in countries such as Japan,
Germany, US and France. These analyses generally tell us that the first two
countries undergo a more product-oriented pattern of innovation than do France
and the US, with large products ranges combined with slow products turn-over.
Since both Germany and Japan can be characterized as centrally-coordinated
models, the increasingly good performance of these two countries in
product-oriented innovations could be interpreted as the result of a their
reactions to changing markets conditions: a « global » increase in the intensity
of market competition leading centrally-coordinated countries (Germany and
Japan) to increase product-oriented research, while pushing market-coordinated
countries (i.e. France and the US) to invest in more knowledge-based R&D.
This could be one reason for the ongoing process of differentiation in national
trajectories of innovation observed by some authors (se Soskice, 1996 and
Amable-Barré-Boyer, 1997).
Once defined the optimal value of the firm’s innovation strategy (z), we
can move on to the definition of the associated equilibrium rate of
unemployment associated. That will be done in the next section of the paper.
V. Global equilibrium configuration
In this section, I will show how one can determine the equilibrium rate of
unemployment associated with each of the two patterns of innovation
disentangled above. My main interest is to present results concerning the
expected relationship between unemployment and innovation, that is the shape
of what I will call the unemployment curve. In order to do that, I have to go
back to first-order conditions presented in section IV above, in order to solve the
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whole model. Then, the equilibrium number of firms/sectors (variable N) will in
turn be determined too, due to the condition of equilibrium on the labor market:
(1-u*)LF = NL*, where u* is the equilibrium rate of unemployment and LF the
total labor force.
V.a The unemployment curve
To determine the equilibrium rate of unemployment, let me first go back
to the four first-order conditions set out in the equation 13 above (13).
Combining (a) and (b) we can determine the firm’s optimal incentive scheme
(that is, the equilibrium ratio of monitoring and the cost of job loss); then we
can use this result to substitute for monitoring into conditions (b) and (c);
finally, by combining conditions (b) and (c) we determine the equilibrium
relationship between wage and the unemployment rate, i.e. what is generally
called the wage curve (hereafter, w(u)). In order to define the equilibrium rate of
unemployment we just have to combine the wage curve and the constant unit
cost’s condition (b). This gives us the first condition for price determination,
that is the optimal price coming from the cost mark-up behavior of firms (14):
(18) P*s = 1/(D·hecw), with w* = w(u),  wcu < 0.
Then we have to consider this together with the second condition for price
determination that is coming from the zero-profit condition:
(19) P*s = ( ) ( )
( )1 1
- ×
+
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
-
a
v
a aG z
F zH .
If we equate the two price conditions above, and substitute the wage curve
w* for w, we finally obtain an equilibrium relationship between the
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unemployment rate and the innovation strategy z (that I will call the
unemployment curve):
(20) K(zH)-cHwc-(1-a-b) - 1 1
1
a
v
a
a a
×
+
- ×
Ø
º
Œ
ø
ß
œ
-F zH
G z( ) ( )
( )
= C(w(u), z) = 0,
where K is a given constant.
It is straightforward to note that the sign of the unemployment curve is
given by: ¶
¶
¶ ¶
¶ ¶
u
z
C z
C u
= - . One can easily show that C´u >0, while concerning C´z
two opposite effects are at work and it is therefore difficult to conclude about its
sign (15). These two effects come from the two price equations that combine to
determine the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The first one (eq. 18), coming
from firms’ pricing behavior, tells us that an increase in product-oriented
research (variable z) determines a reduction of unitary production costs; the
second one (eq. 19), says that an increase of z produces an increase of
anticipated profits and therefore a reduction of the price level compatible with
the zero-profit condition. If the first effect dominates, the unemployment rate
should decrease when z increases, in order to bring up again unitary cost
through wage pressure. The opposite holds when the second effect dominated.
The result of the combination of these two factors mostly depends on the level
of z and u. One can show that C´z >0 (and the mark-up effect dominates) when
unemployment is high and z low (which means that du/dz < 0), while C´z < 0
(and the « zero-profit condition » effect dominates) when unemployment is low
and z high (which means that du/dz > 0). We can thus represent the
unemployment curve as an U-shaped curve as in figure 1 below.
29
u
z
a / 1 - b
Figure 1
The figure shows that, when z increases from low to high values,
unemployment first reduces and then starts to increases too. The same thing
happens when z decreases from high to low values. The two cases are good
representations of the process of diverging specialization of the centrally
coordinated versus the market-coordinated model in respectively product-
oriented versus knowledge-based R&D. In both cases, then, specialization in a
new form of innovation has, first, a positive impact on unemployment since it
allows to strengthen investments in an emerging field of innovation, at the same
time subtracting them from the established one. However, when the new pattern
of innovation is established, the impact of innovation on unemployment is likely
to become negative. This result is coherent with the main result in Aghion and
Howitt’s paper showing that the employment impact of growth is likely to
become negative at high growth rates. Besides that, the model shows that what
actually matter in determining adverse effects of innovation on employment is a
strong specialization in an established pattern of innovation.
V.b The equilibrium rate of unemployment
Considering both the optimal innovation strategy (derived in section IV)
as well as the unemployment curve presented above, the global equilibrium
configuration can easily be determined. In particular, it is interesting to analyze
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the effect on structural unemployment brought about by the process of
specialization in national patterns of innovation (described in the previous
sections). In fact, increasing competitive pressure is likely to have two main
effects in my model:
 the first one is the standard direct effect of D on firms pricing behavior (16):
increasing competitive pressure corrects firms’ imperfectly competitive
behavior and therefore reduces the mark up over costs. This is generally
expected to have a positive impact on structural unemployment via a
downward shift of the unemployment curve (and this is actually the case here
under some parametric assumptions);
 the second effect is an indirect one, working via the modification of firms’
innovation strategies; increasing specialization is likely to push the economic
systems toward one of the extremities of the unemployment curve and
therefore has a negative impact on structural unemployment.
The final result in terms of unemployment evolution ultimately depends on
the combination of these two effects, and therefore on the relative impact of
competitive pressure on, respectively, pricing behavior and innovation
strategies.
u
zzC C *zM C
Figure 2
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The above results could actually help explaining the long-run evolution of
the equilibrium rate of unemployment in developed countries such as Germany
vs. Japan, and France vs. the US. In particular, the general overtime increase in
the level of structural unemployment could be the result of a long-run
macroeconomic evolution (i.e., increase in the intensity of markets’ competition)
reinforcing cross-country specialization in well-established patterns of
innovation: respectively, product-oriented R&D for the centrally coordinated
model and knowledge-based research for the market-coordinated model). If the
counter-balancing effect acting via firms’ pricing behavior is not strong enough,
then this process ultimately pushes the economic systems towards one of the two
extremities of the U-shaped unemployment curve above.
VI. Conclusion
In the paper, a generalized efficiency wage model is proposed to analyze
firms’ choice about employment and innovation as conditioned by a (given) set
of institutional parameters. More precisely, two institutional configurations
have been compared: one where firms act in a centralized coordination
framework; a second one where firms act in a decentralized market-coordination
framework. This distinction is assumed to grasp the opposed institutional
models characterizing the Japanese and German economies as compared to
France and the US.
Under some parametric conditions, it is shown that different equilibrium
strategies of innovation emerges according to the prevailing institutional
configuration. Building on this result, the level of the associated equilibrium
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rate of unemployment is derived. This allows me to characterize differences in
national trajectories of innovation and employment performances.
I subsequently study the effect on the above national trajectories of a
change in the intensity of products market competition. I show that this leads the
firms in a centrally coordinated framework to reinforce the product-oriented
nature of their research, while firms in the market-coordinated configuration are
instead driven to increase the proportion of knowledge-based R&D. This
divergent specialization, as far as the innovation activities are concerned, also
has an impact on the equilibrium rate of unemployment that can be described
through an U-shaped curve linking the equilibrium unemployment rate to the
optimal innovation strategy.
The model can therefore help us understanding how institutional settings
may account for the persistence of cross-country differences in unemployment
and innovation patterns and also explain divergent national responses in relation
to an alike modification in the intensity of competition on products markets. The
above results deliver us a picture stressing the institutionally determined nature
of both the equilibrium rate of unemployment as well as innovation patterns.
This may allow us to throw some light on the structural determinants of national
patterns of innovation. At the same time, the model helps understanding the
possible interactions between different forms of innovation and the level of the
equilibrium rate of unemployment.
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Appendix
1) Solving the internal coordination  problem.
wY/wE = 0  JE(J-1)(n ~t  - E(n ~t )G)1-J - E J(1-J)(n ~t  - E(n ~t )G)-J(n ~t )G =
0,
that gives us the result: E* = g
d1 1
n t×
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2) Optimal innovation strategy: condition for interior solutions.
The centrally-coordinated firms:
where D0, D1, D2, are endogenously determined constants:
D0 = (1-c)/[1-c(H+1)+a],
D1 = (2-c)/[2-c(H+1)+a],
D2 = (3-2c)/[3-2c(H+1)+2a].
The market-coordinated firms:
3)  Determining equilibrium unemployment.
Consider the four first-order conditions below:
.a wS/wm = 0  Pshecm = 1/D,
conditions for an internal solution
z* > 0     a > cH
D0 < D < D1
z* < 1  D < D2
conditions for an internal solution
z* > 0     D < 1/(H+1)
z* < 1  c > 1/2
D < (2c-1)/[2c(H+1)-1]
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.b wS/ww = 0  Pshecw = 1/D,
.c wS/wL = 0  DPshe = w + ~t + m.
.d wS/wz = 0  GczS + G(z)DPs(eczhL+ ehczL) - Y·H = 0.
Combining (a) and (b) we can determine the firm’s optimal incentive
scheme (that is, the equilibrium ratio of monitoring and the cost of job loss);
then we can use this result to substitute for monitoring into conditions (b) and
(c); finally, by combining conditions (b) and (c) we determine the equilibrium
relationship between wage and the unemployment rate, i.e. what is generally
called the wage curve:
w* = 
a t b u w
b u a
× + - × - × ×
- × - × -
~ ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
n
n
, with ¶
¶
w
u
*
< 0 .
Note that, in order for wages to be positive and avoid wage explosion, a
minimum unemployment rate (umin) exists such that:
u > umin = a / (1-b)(1-Q).
The minimum unemployment rate increases when the probability of a
fundamental innovation grows up: this is linked to the incentive-reducing role of
the knowledge-based R&D’s intensity.
In order to define the equilibrium rate of unemployment we just have to
combine the wage curve and the constant unit cost’s condition that is (from
condition (b) above):
hecm = hecw = 1/(D Ps),
1/ecw = (w + ~t + m) / e  P*s = (1/D)·[(w + ~t + m)/he] = 1/(D·h
ecw)
w* = w(u),  wcu < 0.
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Then, to obtain the equation for the unemployment curve, we have to
consider the condition above together with the second condition for price
determination that  comes from the zero-profit condition, that is the following:
P*s = ( ) ( )
( )1 1- ×
+
Ø
º
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ø
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œ
-
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v
a aG z
F zH .
4) The slope of the unemployment curve.
In order to determine the slope of the unemployment curve, we have to
know the sign of the two partial derivatives: C´u  and C´z. Concerning C´u  one
can easily see that:
un  wp  wcp  C´u > 0,
which allows me to determine the sign of the partial derivative of C with respect
to the unemployment variable (u).
However, concerning the derivative of C with respect to z, we must note
that:
zn  (zH)-cHwc-(1-a-b) n,
1
1
1
a
v
a
a a
×
+
- ×
Ø
º
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ø
ß
œ
-F zH
G z( ) ( )
( )
n,
that is, two opposite effects are at work and it is therefore difficult to conclude
about the sign of C´z . The result of the combination of these two factors mostly
depends on the level of z and u. In fact, resolving equation (20) with respect to
the variable z, one can see that:
C´z |R·u - d·z(d-1)·(1+z)(1-D)/D·(z·(1-b)·u-a)(a+b) - 1 - a
a
·zd·(1+z)(1-2D)/D·(z·(1-b)·u-
a)(a+b),
R=(1-b)·(1-a-b) and d>0 being constant.
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Therefore, we can reasonably assume that C´z > 0 (and the mark-up effect
dominates) when unemployment is high and z low (which means that du/dz < 0),
while C´z < 0 (and the « zero-profit condition » effect dominates) when
unemployment is low and z high (which means that du/dz > 0).
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Footnotes
                                                       
1
 The theory of growth has rarely dealt with this subject. Aghion and Howitt (1994) propose a model
where innovation is the source of growth and has opposite direct/indirect effects on unemployment;
Boyer (1988) proposes a model where accumulation and technological change jointly determine
employment evolution.
2
 A second reason for that is that I only focus on a stable population of firms, and therefore I d not
treat the phenomenon of start-up. Generally speaking, one main interest of incumbent firms is to
strengthen their market positions (i.e. through product improvements) rather then to create entirely
new markets.
3
 This assumption actually has some important consequences. In fact, is means that the economy will
fluctuate across different « regimes of competition », that is monopoly and perfect competition.
Monopoly prevails when a fundamental innovation occurs and firms exploit it through radically new
products; perfect competition follows then when these products become obsolete. Of course this
affects the determination of the equilibrium rate of unemployment for the economy since it will
fluctuate too according to regime’ changes. However this is easily incorporated into the model for it
simply determines a temporary shift of the whole economy from one equilibrium to another
(therefore fundamental innovations affect the rhythm of economic cycles). Since I have already
developed a full analysis of the equilibrium rate of unemployment in perfectly competitive markets
(see Gatti, 1998), I will not treat this topic here.
4
 This is just a simplifying assumption taken up in order to avoid introducing too many parameters
into the analysis. If we consider that knowledge-based research is a decreasing return to scale
activity too, then a sufficient condition for subsequent results to hold is knowledge-based research
coefficient to be larger then the one for product-oriented innovation.
5
 This allows me to avoid addressing the question of cross-sector strategically behavior, that is not
my main focus here.
6
 In the following sub-sections, I present a formal micro-institutional analysis building on a
framework developed in a previous paper (see Gatti, 1998).
7
 The same assumption is taken up by other authors. Saint-Paul (1996, p. 3) for instance assumes
that workers with higher (intrinsic) turn-over are characterized by a lower cost of job loss. The same
hypothesis can be found in OCDE (1997).
8
 In a previous paper (Gatti, 1998) I develop a more complete analysis where workers competence
are assumed to be only imperfectly transferable. For the sake of simplicity I do not take up this issue
here. Since innovation patterns are likely to be one major determinant of the intensity of competence
transferability, this issue would lead me to treat the cumulative link between innovation and
competence which is not my main focus here.
9
 See the appendix (point 1) for more details. This is not a too strong hypothesis since, (nt)G
being a cost and therefore a generally convex function, G can easily be assumed to be greater than
1. Then, it is sufficient to fixe a values’ range for J such that this parameter turns out not be bigger
than 1/G.
10
 This perspective underlines the role of organizational resources as the main determinant of a
firm’s capacity to expand. In this sense, organizational resources can be seen as the only long-run
constraint faced by firms when they try to grow through diversification (see also Penrose, 1959 on
this point).
11
 Necessary restrictions on the parameter, for the interior solution to exist, are set out in the
appendix (point2).
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12
 Necessary restrictions on the parameter, for the interior solution to exist, are set out in the
appendix (point2).
13
 The entire procedure is detailed in the appendix (point 3).
14
 The entire procedure is detailed in the appendix (point 3).
15
 The entire procedure is detailed in the appendix (point 3).
16
 One can see Layard at al. (1991) on this point, chap. 6 and 7 in particular.
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